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Some scholars have emphasized that, according to Hume’s claim in the Treatise, D1 is defining the philosophical relation of cause and effect while D2 defines the natural relation. For these reasons, Hume’s discussion leading up to the two definitions should be taken as primary in his account of causation rather than the definitions themselves. But if the definitions fail in this way, then it is problematic that Hume maintains that both are adequate definitions of causation. You are not separate from the external world. One alternative to fitting the definitions lies in the possibility that they are doing two separate things, and it might therefore be inappropriate to reduce one to the other or claim that one is more significant than the other. Each pin stack is cut in one or more places perpendicular to its length. The numbers on the front of the practice locks indicate the keying codes, from the front-most pin stack to the rear-most. Practice picking the two pin lock until you can do it easily and naturally. It’s much more like the practice of medicine, as when you say: "I practice medicine." It means you do it every day.

An object precedent and contiguous to another, and where all the objects resembling the former are placed in like relations of precedency and contiguity to those objects that resemble the latter. Ott 2009: 239) This way of dismissing the nonequivalence of the two definitions becomes more problematic, however, when we realize that Hume does not make the distinction between natural and philosophical relations in the Enquiry, yet provides approximately the same two definitions. There are reams of literature addressing whether these two definitions are the same and, if not, to which of them Hume gives primacy. There are several interpretations that allow us to meaningfully maintain the distinction (and therefore the nonequivalence) between the two definitions unproblematically. Having approached Hume’s account of causality by this route, we are now in a position to see where Hume’s two definitions of causation given in the Treatise come from. We may therefore now say that, on Hume’s account, to invoke causality is to invoke a constant conjunction of relata whose conjunction carries with it a necessary connection.

Nevertheless, ‘causation’ carries a stronger connotation than this, for constant conjunction can be accidental and therefore doesn’t get us the necessary connection that gives the relation of cause and effect its predictive ability. In fact, later in the Treatise, Hume states that necessity is defined by both, either as the constant conjunction or as the mental inference, that they are two different senses of necessity, and Hume, at various points, identifies both as the essence of connection or power. Ergo, the idea of necessity that supplements constant conjunction is a psychological projection. Hume’s Copy Principle demands that an idea must have come from an impression, but we have no impression of efficacy in the event itself. In fact, such an interpretation might better explain Hume’s dissatisfaction over the definitions. We cannot claim direct experience of predictions or of general laws, but knowledge of them must still be classified as matters of fact, since both they and their negations remain conceivable.

My father was, in fact, a singularly good-natured man, and I think quietly enjoyed nature's practical joke. However, Hume has just given us reason to think that we have no such satisfactory constituent ideas, hence the "inconvenience" requiring us to appeal to the "extraneous." This is not to say that the definitions are incorrect. It seems to be the laws governing cause and effect that provide support for predictions, as human reason tries to reduce particular natural phenomena "… Some scholars have argued for ways of squaring the two definitions (Don Garrett, for instance, argues that the two are equivalent if they are both read objectively or both read subjectively), while others have given reason to think that seeking to fit or eliminate definitions may be a misguided project. Falle-Safe Security makes a set of vertically-oriented two-prong torque tools designed to fit snugly in a range of different pin tumbler keyways. The second step of the causal realist interpretation will be to then insist that we can at least suppose (in the technical sense) a genuine cause, even if the notion is opaque, that is, to insist that mere suppositions are fit for doxastic assent. It is the internal impression of this "oomph" that gives rise to our idea of necessity, the mere feeling of certainty that the conjunction will stay constant.

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